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I. THE PRODUCTION-RELATIONS HYPOTHESIS 
In a Swedish-language book on productivity and profitability, Erik 
Lundberg (1961, pp. 130, 131) introduced the economics profession to 
the “Horndal effect”: 
During a period of fifteen years beginning in the mid- 1930s one of the steel works 
(Horndal) of the Fagersta concern was neglected. No new investments were made 
* Previous drafts of this paper were presented to the Seminar on the Capitalist Enterprise, 
Harvard University, in February 1982, the Economic History Workshop, Harvard University, 
in April 1982, and the 23rd Annual Cliometrics Conference, University of Iowa, in May 
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February 1984. Research assistance was provided by Mary Deery, Greg Frazier, Lindti 
Gray, Kathy Hanson, Robert Runcie, Wei Wong, and, especially, Eliot R&en. Diana Dill 
and Marta Wenger did some of the computer work. Florence Bartoshevsky and the staff 
of the Baker Library Manuscripts Division of the Harvard Graduate School of Business 
Administration offered invaluable assistance in directing us to the relevant documents and 
data sources. Jo Anne Preston supplied us with data on Massachusetts school teachers. 
Steven Dubnoff offered advice on the use of his data set on the ethnicity of mill workers, 
and also brought to our attention the data set compiled by the PhiladeIphia Social History 
project. We received useful comments and criticisms from Barry Eichengreen, Stanley 
Engerman, Louis Ferleger, Richard Freeman, Herbert G&is, Stephen Marghn, William 
Mass, Joel Mokyr, Gary Solon, Mark Watson, and Robert Zevin, as well as two anonymous 
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53 
0014:4983/85 $3.00 
Copyright 0 1985 by Academic Press, k. 
AI1 rights of reprodtxtiorr in any form reserved. 
54 LAZONICK AND BRUSH 
except for a minimum of repairs and broken equipment replacement (without 
modernization). In spite of this, there was an annual increase in man-hour production 
of two percent during this period. This compares to a production growth per 
man-hour of four percent for the whole concern. In other plants of the company 
significant new investments were made during this time.’ 
Lundberg referred to the “Horndal effect” as “pure productivity,” 
making no attempt to discover the underlying causes. Instead he called 
for more analysis “to show the importance of all the undefined factors 
which are covered under [these] all-encompassing and diffuse labels” 
(Lundberg, 1961, p. 133). 
Some U.S. economists, however, have not been at all reticent to cite 
the Horndal experience (as reported by Lundberg) as evidence to support 
very specific explanations of productivity growth. In a seminal article 
on “learning by doing,” Kenneth Arrow (1962) argued that the sustained 
productivity growth at Horndal could “only be imputed to learning from 
experience”. More recently, Paul David (1973, 1975, Chap. 2) has analyzed 
the “Horndal effect” in Lawrence Mill No. 2, a cotton textile mill that 
began operations in Lowell, Massachusetts in 1834. According to David, 
labor productivity at Lawrence Mill No. 2 increased at an average com- 
pounded rate of just under 2% per annum from 1835 to 1856 despite the 
absence of investment in new machinery. He goes on to argue that the 
case of Lawrence Mill No. 2 “probably represents the earliest well- 
documented instance of short-run learning effects [making] its story the 
true precursor to the Swedish steel mill built at Horndal a century later.“* 
Like Arrow, David merely assumes that the productivity growth at 
Lawrence Mill No. 2 was the result of “learning by doing.” Neither 
considers the possibility that the “Horndal effect” might have been 
caused by other (to use Lundberg’s words) “undefined factors.” Little 
or no evidence is presented in either case-the Swedish steel mill or the 
American textile mill-to establish that the temporal configuration of the 
“sustained” productivity growth even took the form of a “learning curve.” 
For the steel mill, the only evidence cited is that productivity grew at 
an average of 2% per annum for 15 years. For the textile mill, David 
uses four data points, representing his estimates for peak labor productivity 
levels over the period 1835-1856, and finds that the “least-squares fit of 
the ‘learning curve’ proves most satisfactory indeed.” He concludes 
’ Translation by S. Herzenberg. 
’ The Homdal mill was not built in the mid-1930s as David claims, but was already a 
going concern in the early 19th century. Major investments in plant and equipment were 
made in the 1880s (Soderlund, 1957-1958). These facts in themselves raise serious doubts 
about the applicability of the learning-by-doing argument to Homdal in the 1930s and 1940s 
(see Helper and Lazonick, 1984). 
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Surely the evidence presented here provides sufficient cause . . . to insist that 
Horndal share with Lowell the honor . in giving its name to the productivity 
effect of learning-by-doing in the context of a fixed production facility. (David, 
1975, p. 184) 
A prime purpose of this paper is to test the learning-by-doing hypothesis 
as an explanation of the productivity growth at Lawrence Mill No. 2 
during its first 2 decades of operation. As illustrated in Fig. 1, there 
certainly was sustained productivity growth at Lawrence Mill No. 2 from 
1834 to 1855. Over this period, output (in yards of “type C” cloth per 
weaver-hour) rose steadily (with greater cyclical fluctuations before 1842) 
at an average compounded rate of 3.1% per annum.3 
But can this growth be attributed to learning by doing? The learning- 
by-doing hypothesis implicitly assumes that the relation between inputs 
and output is simply technical in nature, and that the productive capabilities 
of an enterprise will of necessity improve with production experience. 
If this were the case, one might posit a universal explanation-a “technically 
determined” learning curve-for cases of productivity growth on the 
basis of fixed production facilities such as occurred a century apart at 
the U.S. textile mill and the Swedish steel mill. 
But if the relation between inputs and output is partially social in 
nature, then historically specific factors that motivate and condition the 
objectives and work efforts of different participants in the production 
process must be considered in explaining changes in productivity. The 
contention that social factors, and in particular the impact of management- 
worker relations on work ,intensity, were determinants of the observed 
productivity growth at Lawrence Mill No. 2, we call the prodmztion- 
relations hypothesis (see Lazonick, 1984). 
To posit the production-relations hypothesis is not to reject learning 
by doing as one possible explanation of productivity change. The leaming- 
by-doing hypothesis has intuitive appeal. It is reasonable to expect that 
the performance capability of participants in production will improve 
with experience. It is also reasonable to expect that such improved 
capability is “irreversible” (disappearing only with the disappearance of 
the learning entity) and that productive capability will improve at a 
3 It should be noted that David’s growth rate differs from ours. He computed output 
per worker-hour for the whole mill using an indirect method for estimating the number 
of actual worker-hours. The weaving process, from which our productivity growth rate 
is derived, was the most important single component of cloth production in terms of direct 
labor inputs. David also assumed that each of the four peaks in output per worker-hour 
that he derived represented the same phase (the peak) of the business cycle at each point 
in time. In fact, in the main weaveroom, highest levels of output per weaver-hour usually 
occurred in troughs, presumably because inferior weavers were laid off while the slack 
labor.markets meant that the remaining (technically superior) weavers could be compelled 
to work harder than at other times. 
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FIG. 1. Output per weaver-hour, January 1834-November 1855. (Yards of “C” cloth.) 
No data available for May 1836 through March 1838. For variable definition, see Appendix. 
diminishing rate. These assumptions are embodied in the cumulative 
measures of experience that are used in empirical studies of learning by 
doing (see David, 1975, Chaps. 2, 3; Fellner, 1969; Rapping, 1965; She- 
shinski, 1967; Zevin, 1975). 
These assumptions are consistent, moreover, with the basic neoclassical 
proposition that the production function is technically determined. An 
implicit assumption of the hypothesis is that improved performance ca- 
pability will automatically result in improved performance. But if we 
recognize that production is a social process-that social relations, mo- 
tivation, and effort influence production outcomes-then we cannot posit 
such an automatic translation of changes in input capability into changes 
in input performance. 
It is worth noting in this regard that Harvey Leibenstein (1966) cited 
the Horndal case (again as reported by Lundberg, 1961) as evidence to 
support his original formulation of the “X-efficiency” hypothesis-a hy- 
pothesis that cannot possibly be equated with learning by doing unless 
the latter is turned into a mere tautology. Unfortunately, despite numerous 
subsequent books and articles on the subject of “X efficiency,” Leibenstein 
has never tested or developed the hypothesis by means of empirical 
analysis. Hence “X efficiency” has remained a rather vague, and un- 
substantiated, concept. In our formulation of the production-relations 
hypothesis and its application to the experience of Lawrence Mill No. 
2, we hope to reveal something about both the ways in which motivation 
and work effort change over time and the extent to which such social 
factors affect productivity outcomes. 
Our empirical task is to distinguish between the technical determinants 
(of which learning by doing is but one) and the social determinants of 
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productivity growth. The existence of detailed production and payroll 
records for Lawrence Mill No. 2 has made it possible to construct a 
relevant microlevel data set. With the exception of 2 years from 1836 
to 1838 for which payroll records are missing, we have gathered com- 
prehensive month-by-month data on labor nroductivity, piece rates, earn- 
ings, and looms per weaver for every operative who worked in the main 
weaveroom of Mill No. 2 from 1834 to l&55---12,762 observations, of 
which 12,140 are used in regression analysis. Individual operatives have 
also been classified by ethnicity and literacy. We have also compile 
monthly time series on cotton quality, absenteeism, labor turnover, per- 
manent separations, overseers per operative, and the number of auxiliary 
workers (“sparehands”). In addition, we have researched a substantial 
amount of qualitative material including written communications between 
managers within the Lawrence Company and across Lowell cotton textile 
firms.4 
In the next section of the paper, we formulate a production function 
that distinguishes between the technical and social determinants of pro- 
ductivity change. We also provide some general background on changes 
in the nature of the labor supply to the Lowell cotton textile mills that 
is pertinent to the construction of relevant independent variables. In the 
following section, we present our model for analyzing productivity change 
at Lawrence Mill No. 2, a model based on our qualitative understanding 
of the nature of capitalist production, the specific socioeconomic envi- 
ronment in which the textile mill operated, and the types of cross-section 
and time-series data that we have available. In the next section, we 
record the statistical results of pooled times-series, cross-section regression 
analysis of the Lawrence Mill No. 2 data for the period 1834 to 1855. 
In the concluding section, we discuss the implications of these results 
for understanding the nature of the production process and’the determinants 
of productivity change in Lawrence Mill No, 2 as well as in capitalist 
production in general. 
II. TECHNICAL AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF 
PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE 
Given the labor-intensive character of cotton textile production in the 
19th century, our primary problem is to distinguish between increases 
in productivity caused by, on the one hand, the application to the production 
process of improved productive capabilities of workers, and, on the other 
hand, the more complete utilization of the existing productive capabilities 
of workers. In other words, we have to account for changes in the quality 
4 The Lawrence Manufacturing Company records are to be found in the Baker Library 
Manuscripts Division at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. A more 
extensive report on the historical sources is in Brush (1981). 
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of labor power-the capacity to work-as well as changes in the extent 
to which this labor power is actually realized in the form of labor services- 
work effort actually expended in the production process. 
In addition, the analysis of productivity change must distinguish between 
the impacts of changes in the application of labor power to the production 
process and changes in the capital inputs that enter into production. It 
is true that over our period there was no major investment in the capital 
equipment at Lawrence Mill No. 2. Nevertheless, there were potentially 
important modifications and alterations in the quality of the existing 
capital inputs as well as changes in the quantity of capital inputs per 
worker that must be taken into account. 
Let us therefore formulate the production function as q = f (t, h, e), 
where q is output per worker, t is a measure of the productive capability 
of the physical capital inputs available to each worker, h is the productive 
capability of each worker, and e is the work effort actually applied by 
each worker. For simplicity, h can be viewed as the quality of labor 
services inherent in the worker while e can be viewed as the quantity 
of those services actually expended (although in actuality work effort 
itself will obviously have a qualitative dimension). If the productivity of 
physical capital depends on the expenditure of effort by the worker, zero 
work effort will result in zero output per worker no matter what the 
quality of t and h that enter the production process.5 It can be assumed 
that there will be diminishing returns to increases in work effort per unit 
of time and that at some point the marginal product of work effort will 
fall to zero. In this formulation of the production function, increases in 
t and h are effort decreasing in the sense that they permit the worker 
to produce more at the same level of work effort. 
If formulated correctly, the learning-by-doing hypothesis as applied to 
the analysis of the “Horndal effect” posits that increases in q are caused 
by changes in h which accrue through experience at relevant productive 
tasks (be they managerial or operative). The production-relations hypothesis 
posits that increases in q are caused by changes in the level of e, holding 
t and h constant. Our formulation of the production function, focusing 
as it does on the quantitative impacts of qualitative phenomena, brings 
to the fore a host of measurement problems not normally confronted in 
productivity studies. Our. measures of t and h are attempts to capture 
the quantitative impacts of qualitative changes in productive capability. 
Moreover, we do not have a direct measure of e, our purely quantitative 
dimension. Rather we must rely upon our theoretical analysis of the 
’ The characteristics of this production function are elaborated in Lazonick (1984). I f  
work effort is viewed as purely quantitative, zero work effort over a sufficiently long work 
period will always result in zero output; if zero work effort resulted in positive output, 
then the worker would not be necessary to the production process. If  work effort is viewed 
as qualitative, then zero work effort may just result in a lower quality product. 
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social and technical nature of the production process to construct variables 
that cafiture changes in work effort. 
The analysis of the determinants of work effort (or, as Marx called it, 
the intensity of labor) is central to understanding the social relations of 
the capitalist workplace (see Lazonick, 1983a). How hard particular workers 
work will be manifestations of their individual or collective responses 
to incentives, both positive and negative, that the enterprise manager 
holds out. Profit-maximizing managers will attempt to structure incentives 
to minimize unit costs (over an appropriate time horizon). If we assume 
(as most economists implicitly do) that workers view work as a disutility- 
a mere means to an end-then it follows that workers will attempt to 
get the most remuneration for the least possible expenditure of work 
effort. Insofar as workers are successful they will undermine managerial 
attempts to minimize costs. The relation between work effort and rewards 
will be, therefore, an inherently conflictual issue, with the constraints 
on cost minimization by capitalists and “on-the-job” utility maximization 
by workers being determined in part by the relative power of the two 
sides. 
The task of historical analysis is to discover the sources of relative 
power. One source will be exit. The existence of alternative opportunities 
permits individuals to protect not only their earnings but also their work 
conditions. Another source will be collective action-what Hirschman 
(1970) has called “voice’‘-either through formal management-union 
bargaining or informal setting of work norms by the workers themselves. 
If the response of workers to incentives is individualistic, management 
can, the labor market permitting, fire workers whose performance is 
“subpar.” If the response of workers to incentives is collective, however, 
to give all, or even some, of the workers the sack for inadequate per- 
formance may be a prohibitively expensive managerial remedy. 
In the 1830s and well into the 1840s workers in the Lowe11 mills had 
no formal bargaining power. Strikes staged in 1834 and 1836 over wage 
cuts were clearly unsuccessful (Brush, 1981; Dublin, 1979, Chap. 6). I3ut 
these workers did possess considerable power of individual exit. As is 
well known, the labor force in the Lowell mills of the 1830s was made 
up primarily of “Yankee farmgirls.” To attract the daughters of America’s 
yeomanry into the mills required not just relatively high wages but, more 
importantly, good working conditions along with the closely supervised 
structure of life in the Lowell boarding houses. Only then could mill 
work represent a respectable prelude to womanhood. Attempts by Lowell 
managers to cut wages or intensify work could, and at times did, lead 
to an exodus back to the farms and a drying up of new recruits’(at least 
from the regions from which the previous workers had been drawn) 
(Dublin, 1979, Chap. 3;,Ware, 1966, Chap. 8). 
By all accounts, from the late 1830s it became increasingly difficult to 
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recruit an adequate supply of farmgirls. On the demand side, in Lowell 
alone between 1835 and 1847, the number of mills increased by 114%, 
the number of spindles by 158%, the number of looms by 122%, and the 
number of female employees by 71% (Eno, 1976, p. 255). On the supply 
side, the reserves of New England farmgirls were probably declining 
absolutely by the late 1830s as the economic viability of New England 
farming was deteriorating (Bidwell and Falconer, 1925, pp. 237ff, Wilson, 
1936, Chaps.l-4; Field, 1978).6 At the same time, the generally well- 
educated Yankee farmgirls found themselves with an expanding wage- 
employment alternative to working in the mills. Up until the 183Os, school 
teaching during the winter months had been a male-dominated occupation, 
with females-many mill operatives among them-confined largely to 
summer teaching. From the 1830s however, women were increasingly 
employed as winter teachers. As proportions of the winter and summer 
teaching forces in Massachusetts, females were 33 and 93%, respectively, 
in 1839-1840, but 50 and 90%, respectively, in 1849-1850. Over this 
period the number of female winter teachers employed in Massachusetts 
increased from 1079 to 2142 (Preston, 1982). 
As the Yankee farmgirl labor supply dwindled, however, the population 
of Lowell grew-from 18,010 in 1837 to 33,383 in 1850, an increase of 
85%. Increasingly the labor force for the Lowell mills could be drawn 
’ Data from the U.S. Census from 1820, 1840, 1850, 1860, and 1870 show the following 
trends in agricultural employment in the New England states: 
1820 1840 1850 1860 
Massachusetts 
(1) 63,460 87,837 
(2) 0.58 0.41 
Maine 
(1) 55,031 101,630 
(2) 0.82 0.73 
New Hampshire 
(1) 52,384 77,949 
(2) 0.84 0.78 
Vermont 
(1) 50,951 73,150 
(2) 0.85 0.82 
(1) = agricultural employment 









Note. The 1850 Census included only males over 15 in the “total labor force.” To adjust 
the reported labor force figure to include females, the total labor force for each state was 
estimated by using the ratio of total employment to male employment as stated in the 1870 
Census. The 1860 Census includes farmers and farm laborers. 
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from a pool of local urban residents (Eno, 1976, p. 255).7 The boarding- 
house system declined and was replaced by less paternalistic contractual 
relations between management and labor (Dublin, 1979, p. 146). 
like the Yankee farmgirls, the native-born female residents of Lowell 
were not in general dependent on factory work for their sustenance. 
Most of them came from families in which the male head of household 
was able to earn a family wage, and it was exceptional for an American 
woman to remain at mill work once she was married (Dublin, 1979, pp* 
3 1, 32, 50-54). Since the minority of workers who were dependent on 
mill work to earn a basic living in the early 1840s were relatively indis- 
tinguishable parts of a labor force that was not dependent, even they 
were endowed with substantial power to control their work conditions 
and earnings. 
All this changed with the large-scale influx of Irish into the mills in 
the late 1840s. As the data from the Mill No. 2 main weaveroom show, 
output per weaver-hour continued its steady climb from the early 1840s 
until the end of our period whereas from the late 1840s the previously 
horizontal trend in real earnings per hour turned sharply downward (see 
Figs. 1 and 2). Unlike those Yankee workers for whom mill work was 
not essential to the securing of sustenance, the Irish were in general 
dependent on mill earnings for their basic livelihoods. As ~her~str~~ 
(1964, Chap. 4) has shown, the common laboring jobs availabl,e to Irish 
men around 1850 did not provide anywhere near a minimal family wage. 
Hence the earnings of older children and, in many cases, wives were 
crucial components of day-to-day subsistence. Lacking the range of al- 
ternative opportunities open to most American workers and being more 
dependent on mill earnings to meet their basic needs, the Irish had much 
less power to resist intensification of labor implemented by means of 
stretch-outs, speed-ups, and the use of inferior cotton. Moreover, the 
availability of the Irish posed a serious threat to the ability of the remaining 
American workers to resist unremunerated intensification of labor. The 
very presence of the Irish as a reserve army of labor threatened the jobs 
of the Yankees. Furthermore, the social distance between the two groups 
on the shop floor probably made it more difficult to enforce the collective 
setting of output norms in order to protect the relation between work 
effort and pay. 
From the 1830s to the 1850s therefore, two-stage transformation of 
the nature of the labor supply took place; first, from one in which Yankee 
’ Data in the Hamilton Manufacturing Company Register Books show that the net change 
in the number of Hamilton workers who were full-time residents of Lowell as a percentage 
of the net change in Hamilton workers averaged 5.9% in 1834-1838; 9.8% in 1839-1843; 
and 9.9% in 1844-1848. Hamilton Manufacturing Company Register Books, Volumes 482- 
483,485490, Manuscripts and Archives Division, Baker Library, Harvard Graduate School 
of Business Administration. 
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FIG. 2. Average hourly real and nominal wages, January 1834-November 1855. Solid 
lines represent real wages; dotted lines represent nominal wages. No data available for 
May 1836 through March 1838. The nominal wage series is the average hourly earnings 
of weavers in the Lawrence Mill No. 2 main weaveroom. The real wage series is derived 
by dividing the nominal wages series by the Warren-Pearson Index, Base: 1824-1842, in 
Arthur H. Cole, Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United States, 1700-1861 (Harvard 
UP: Cambridge, 1938) Table 45 (Ail Commodity Index of Wholesale Prices with Variable 
Group Weights at New York. Monthly 1797-1861). 
farmgirls predominated to one in which permanent Yankee operatives 
were increasingly prevalent, and then to one characterized by an increasing 
proportion of Irish workers. Given this transformation, there is reason 
to believe that the levels of experience on the part of workers and the 
relative power of management and labor were anything but stable from 
the mid-1830s to the mid-1850s. In particular, we would expect the im- 
portance of learning by doing as a determinant of productivity growth 
to have been greatest in the 1840s when a presumably more experienced, 
permanent Yankee labor force was being employed than in either the 
1830s or 1850s. In contrast, we would expect the strength of management 
to effect unremunerated intensification of labor to have been greatest in 
the last third of our period with the coming of the Irish. It is these 
specific hypotheses that we wish to test with the data drawn from the 
main weaveroom of Lawrence Mill No. 2. 
III. THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION IN EARLY U.S. TEXTILE 
MANUFACTURING 
Our dependent variable, graphed in Fig. 1, is output per worker-hour 
(YWH), the observations being average hourly output of each regular 
weaver (“piecehand”) in the main weaveroom of Mill No. 2 for each 
month from January 1834 through November of 1855 with the exception 
of the period from May 1836 through March 1838 for which payroll 
records are missing. (For 9 of these 23 months, however, Mill No. 2 
was entirely closed down because of depressed economic conditions.) 
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Mill No. 2 produced one standard type of cloth throughout the period 
of analysis, so our productivity measure can be in physical quantities. 
We shall assume that each unit of this cloth was of constant quality at 
each point in time as well as over time. 
Our independent variables are grouped under three headings: (1) technical 
variables (t) that reflect changes in technical conditions that are not 
inherently part of a managerial strategy to intensify labor; (2) human 
capabilities (or physico-cognitive) variables (h) that reflect changes in 
the performance capability of operatives or management; and (3) work 
effort variables (e) that reflect changes in the power of management or 
labor to control the intensity of labor, given t and h. Since some factors 
may reflect changes in both t and e (for example, cotton quality) or h 
and e (for example, overseers per worker), the attribution of factors to 
particular categories depends crucially upon our identification of the 
phenomena that the variables are capturing, and hence upon our prior 
knowledge of the nature of the production process. What follows is a 
general description of the variables that enter into a production function 
that relates output per weaver-hour in Lawrence Mill No. 2 to technical 
conditions, the physico-cognitive abilities of human resources, and the 
relative power of management and workers to control the levels of work 
effort. (For the variables listed.below, a more,complete technical desc3ription 
and discussion is provided in the Appendix.) 
Technical Capabilities (t) Variables 
(1) Dl, D2, . . . Dll are monthly dummy variables (January through 
November, respectively) that adjust ‘for variations in the technical capability 
of the Lawrence Mill No. 2 weaveroom because of seasonal factors. 
Four such factors stand out: increased yarn breakages during the dry 
winter months; “freshets” or backwaters that typically occurred in April, 
rendering the power source, and hence production, irregular despite the 
locks and canal system; shortages of water power in the summer and 
fall months; and the heat of the summer months (July and August) which 
may have had a negative impact on the productive capabilities of workers 
at any given level of work effort. The third factor, however, was not an 
annual occurrence, and so is treated separately below as WPOW. 
(2) DTECHl is a dummy variable to control for the introduction of a 
relatively inexpensive, but potentially important, technical change in the 
main weaveroom in May 1X35. What was described in the company 
records as an “alteration of looms” was probably a device that made 
the shifting of the pace weight se&acting. The resultant improvement in 
the let-off motion permitted the production of more consistent and stan- 
dardized cloth. 
(3) DTECH2 is a dummy variable to control for the introduction of a 
new type of cotton picker into the’ mills of the Lawrence ManPtfa$uring 
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Company in August 1844. By permitting the transformation of a given 
grade and staple of cotton into a higher quality cotton input, the cotton 
picker would have permitted more output for the same amount of labor 
effort, holding grade and staple of cotton constant. 
(4) DCOTL2 is the cotton quality variable, RCOTL (described below), 
interacted with DTECH2. This interactive variable allows us to test the 
hypothesis that the preparation of cotton and its consequent impact on 
output per worker varies significantly with the quality of raw cotton 
used. 
(5) WPOW is a dummy variable that controls for periods of deficiencies 
in power supply because of water shortages in the Lowell locks and 
canals system. During such periods the output of the mill was constrained 
by lack of power, and hence management had an interest in maximizing 
output per unit of available water power. To do so management lowered 
the speed of the looms, reducing both power consumption and yarn 
breakages. It appears that they then reduced the size of the labor force 
temporarily, giving the remaining workers more of the slower looms to 
tend for the duration of the power shortage, but at the piece rate that 
had previously prevailed. This temporary increase in loom complements 
is not captured by our looms per weaver variable (LPW below) since it 
is derived from piece-rate changes (see Appendix). 
Human Capabilities (h) Variables 
(6) LNTIME, the logarithm of cumulative months since Lawrence Mill 
No. 2 opened for operation, is a conventional measure of learning by 
doing. In fact, Paul David uses this measure in his study of productivity 
growth in Lawrence Mill No. 2. In early U.S. cotton firms, labor turnover 
was certainly much higher than managerial turnover, and the very existence 
of the company records, now at our disposal, demonstrates that the 
retiring managers did pass on a substantial amount of information and 
know-how to their successors. We can assume, therefore, that cumulated 
learning in Mill No. 2 resided in management. Hence LNTIME represents 
the managerial contribution to the productive efficiency of the Mill No. 
2 weaveroom.’ 
’ In his study of “learning by doing” in New England textiles, Zevin (1975, p. 5) argues 
that “the manager alone could be the repository of knowledge acquired from production 
experience and that this knowledge could be used to make old and new workers and 
machines more productive.” We would argue, however, that the productivity results of 
many management decisions are determined not so much by accumulated managerial 
knowledge, but more by changes in the structure of production relations. As one of the 
authors has shown in another context (Lazonick, 1983b), much managerial knowledge may 
become irrelevant or even an obstacle to productivity growth as production relations 
change. Zevin (1975, p. 5) also argues that over time management learns “the most efficient 
intensity of production.” But given the inherent contlict over the intensity of labor, managers 
and workers may by no means have been in agreement over just what the proper measure 
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(7) LNEXPADJ, the logarithm of the number of cumulative days worked 
by each weaver whose name appears on the payroll in any given month, 
is an attempt to capture the impact of weaving operatives’ on-the-job 
experience as distinct from the experience of the “mill” as a whole. We 
have incomplete information on the actual relevant experience of individual 
workers. We have virtually complete information on days spent in the 
main weaveroom of Mill No. 2, but we do not know how much experience 
was acquired in other rooms at the Lawrence Manufacturing Company 
or at other textile mills. The longer the average careers of Lowell mill 
workers and the shorter the average stay in the Mill No. 2 main weaveroom, 
the less problematic these truncated job profiles become since in the 
extreme there would be no reason to assume that, in any given month, 
those with more experience acquired in the Mill No. 2 weaveroom had 
any more or less externally acquired experience than those with less 
internally acquired experience. As explained below, however, we can 
correct for the bias inherent in truncated job profiles by performing 
regression analysis on deviations of monthly observations for individuals 
from the historical (Mill No. 2 main weaveroom) means for those 
individuals. 
(8) CAPUTIL is a measure of capacity utilization in the Mill No. 2 
maih weaveroom (see Fig. 3). It permits us to take into account variations 
in output per worker-hour caused by variations in demand. As noted 
above (note 3), the highest levels of output per worker-hour usually 
occurred in troughs of the business cycle. During booms, management 
could sell as much cloth as the fixed machinery capacity could produce, 
an inducement to maximize output per Zoom. But in slumps, with inventories 
piling up and productive capacity outstripping demand, management would 
be more inclined toward maximizing output per worker. This objective 
could be achieved by laying off inferior workers, increasing the rmmber 
of looms per weaver, and slowing somewhat the speed of each loom. 
Up until the early 1840s and then less systematically in the early 18.5 
of “efficiency” should be. It should also be noted that David specifies a log-log relationship 
between cumulated time and output per worker-hour, hence positing that each successive 
increase in elapsed time leads to equivalent percentage increases in output per worker. 
Given what we know about productivity growth without technical change in capital inputs, 
however, we have doubts about the appropriateness of this functional relationship. In 
effect, David is assuming that it is just as easy to obtain equivalent percentage increases 
in output per worker-hour at higher levels of output as at lower levels of output. We 
would argue that it becomes more difficult. In order to model this assumption, we specify 
a linear-log relationship between cumulated time and output per work$r-hour, in effect 
positing that each successive 1% increase in elapsed time results in equivalent absolute 
increments (and hence declining percent increments) in output per worker-hour. The same 
arguments apply to our modeling of the relation between individual workers’ experience 
and output per worker-hour, below. 
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FIG. 3. Capacity utilization, January 1834-November 1855. (Ratio of looms tended to 
looms available.) No data available for May 1836 through March 1838. For the reason that 
capacity utilization is sometimes greater than 1.0, see Appendix. 
Mill No. 2 management explicitly made note of high productivity workers 
in the payroll books, and apparently used this information as a basis for 
deciding who to retain in slack periods. Also, when water shortages 
compelled the mill to operate at less than full capacity, weavers tended 
an extra loom at lower speeds causing labor productivity to rise. It could 
be argued that the impact of CAPUTIL on labor productivity reflects 
changes in work effort as well as changes in the quality of physical 
capital. In slumps, management often temporarily altered the looms per 
weaver ratio from two to three and less often from three to four, typically 
slowing the speed of the looms somewhat as the number of looms per 
weaver increased. In addition, the power of management to intensify the 
labor of employed workers was undoubtedly greater in a downturn than 
in an upturn. We believe, however, that we have captured any impacts 
on work effort directly by means of our “work effort” variables listed 
below so that changes in CAPUTIL will reflect changes in human ca- 
pabilities rather than changes in the intensity of labor. 
(9) SPARPAUX is the number of “sparehands” doing auxiliary work 
for each piecehand (regular weaver) in the Mill No. 2 main weaveroom. 
“Sparehands” (also called “dayhands” since they were on day rates) 
were employed to learn to weave. Typically, one or two “sparehands” 
were actually relatively high-paid weavers whose job it was to teach 
fresh recruits. How was the work of sparehands related to the work of 
piecehands? We have evidence that sparehands were doing weaving 
independently of regular weavers. We have found no evidence, however, 
that sparehands were doing auxiliary tasks such as weft carrying and 
cleaning that would have had a direct effect on the productivity of weavers. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that at certain points in our time period 
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management redivided labor in the weaveroom, utilizing sparehands to 
perform tasks previously done by regular weavers. For periods following 
such redivisions of labor (if in fact they did occur), our measure of output 
per weaver-hour, including as it does only the output and hours of 
piecehands, would be inflated. SPARPAUX is meant to control (albeit 
in a rather crude way) for this possibility. 
Work Effort (e) Variables 
These variables are the most complex in our model. We can divide 
them into two types: (a) “managerial strategy” variables, reflecting the 
power of management to get more work effort out of their workers; and 
‘3) “workers’ control” variables, reflecting the power of workers to 
control the relation between the levels of work effort they expend and 
the rewards they receive. 
(a) Managerial Strategy 
(10) LPW is the average number of looms tended by each weaver in 
Mill No. 2 during any given month (see Fig. 4). Management can attempt 
to intensify work by “stretching-out” (more looms per weaver) and/or 
by “speeding-up” (more picks per minute per loom). A stretch-out from 
say two to three looms per weaver does not necessarily increase either 
work effort or output per worker-hour. The looms are always slowed 
somewhat when stretch-out occurs, but not necessarily to the point where 
work effort expended per unit of labor-time is at the pre-stretch-out 
level. Since the slowing of looms per se is effort saving (less yarn breaks 
per unit of time) while the increase in looms per worker per se is effort 
increasing (attention must be paid to more looms), the change in the 
level of work effort required to achieve the same level of output both 
1835 II340 1845 1850 1855 
Dote 
FIG. 4. Average number of looms per weaver, January 1834-November 1855. No data 
available for May 1836 through March 1838. For variable definition, see Appendix. 
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before and after the shift to more looms will depend on how these two 
effects counterbalance one another. If we assume that for any given 
change in loom complements, the same level of output would require 
the same level of work effort before and after the change, then a positive 
relation between LPW and YWH would indicate intensification of labor. 
(11) RCOTL is an index of the \quality of cotton used by Mill No. 2 
(see Fig. 5). An increase in cotton quality (either in terms of longer staple 
length or cleaner grade) is a form of effort-decreasing technical change: 
more output per worker-hour can be produced with the same amount 
of work effort because, other things equal, there will be fewer yarn 
breaks per hour and hence less downtime. A significant positive relation 
between RCOTL and YWH would be consistent with the hypothesis 
that over time management makes trade-offs based on the relative prices 
of inputs and outputs between higher unit cotton costs and higher levels 
of physical productivity. But precisely because higher quality cotton is 
more expensive, management may very well choose to use lower quality 
cotton to cut raw material costs even though such a choice of technique 
will, other things equal, result in lower levels of productivity because 
of more downtime (caused by more yarn breaks per unit of time). Man- 
agement will find it particularly attractive to use low quality cotton when 
it can ensure that “other things” will not remain equal: when it has the 
power to compel workers to work harder to repair more yarn breaks per 
unit of time even though the harder work may not result in either higher 
levels of output or earnings per hour.’ A significant negative relation 
between RCOTL and YWH, therefore, would strongly support the hy- 
pothesis that management introduced lower quality cotton in periods 
when it had enhanced power to intensify labor, enabling it to achieve 
simultaneously lower cotton costs and higher levels of labor productivity. 
On a priori grounds, the observed deterioration of cotton quality over 
our period (see Fig. 5) leads us to classify RCOTL as a work effort 
variable rather than a physical capital variable. 
(12) OPW is the number of overseers per worker in any given month. 
Throughout our period there were one to five overseers in the main 
weaveroom, although the usual number was two or three. OPW tended 
to increase over the period as a whole because supervisory personnel 
were not eliminated in proportion to the decline in the number of weavers 
employed as the complement of looms per weaver rose from two to three 
and then to four. Since the amount of machinery to be overseen remained 
constant throughout this period, we interpret increases in OPW as reflecting 
closer supervision. A rise in OPW, however, will not automatically result 
’ For a more extensive analysis of the interaction of changes in cotton quality with 
production relations and the resultant impact on productivity and costs, see Lazonick 
(1981), Lazonick and Mass (1984), and Mass (1984). 
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FIG. 5. Cotton quality index by month of use, January 1834-November 18.55. (Ratio 
of mill price to New York price of Uplands cotton.) No data available for May 1836 through 
March 1838. For variable definition, see Appendix. 
in higher levels of labor productivity. Closer supervision will yield pro- 
ductivity results when the collective or individual power of workers to 
resist intensification of labor is weak. 
(6) Workers’ Control 
(13) ABSENT is a measure of absenteeism for individual weavers; 
that is, the amount of voluntary and temporary labor mobility that Mill 
No. 2 weavers enjoyed during their employment in the main weaveroom. 
A human capital theorist might predict a negative relation between 
ABSENT and YWH on the assumption that individual workers lose job- 
relevant skills when they experience frequent separations. It is not known, 
however, what workers did during their temporary absences from the 
main weaveroom. They may very well have gone to work at other Lowell 
mills that offered superior work conditions. Our interpretation of ABSENT 
is that it reflects the power of workers to exit temporarily from unsat- 
isfactory work environments. When ABSENT is high, management efforts 
to intensify labor are more constrained by the fear of aggravating the 
problem of high levels of absenteeism. Like the human capital theorist, 
we would predict a negative relation between ABSENT and YWH, but 
we would interpret the impact of ABSENT to be on the level of work 
effort rather than on the level of human capabilities in the production 
function. 
(14) FALLPRES measures the extent to which individual workers were 
present in Mill No. 2 in the summer and fall months, that is, July- 
November (see Fig. 6 for annual average FALLPRES). This variable 
represents an attempt to capture the supposed transition from an im- 
permanent (Yankee farmgirl) to a permanent (urban resident) labor force 
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FIG. 6. Annual average FALLPRES (permanent workforce), January 1834-November 
1855. No data available for May 1836 through March 1838. Calculations for 1836 based 
on average of first 4 months; for 1838, average of last 9 months; and for 1855, average 
for first 11 months. For variable definition, see Appendix. 
in Lowell. We have no direct measure of “farmgirl” status, or lack 
thereof, among the Lowell operatives. But it has been generally argued 
that those with agrarian attachments would typically return to the farms 
during the hot summer months and would help with the harvest and 
putting up food in the early fall. If we could identify who these people 
were in the Mill No. 2 sample, we could test the hypothesis that, because 
of this alternative opportunity, operatives with continuing ties to the 
agrarian sector were better able to avoid unremunerated intensification 
of labor during their stints as weavers than those who lacked such ties. 
(15) LPQUITD measures the ability of weavers to quit the Mill No. 
2 main weaveroom pevnanently (in contrast to ABSENT and FALLPRES 
which measure temporary separations). We have lagged our measure of 
permanent quits 1 month to test the hypothesis that the ability of workers 
to depart definitively from the weaveroom constrained managerial attempts 
to intensify labor. 
(16) TEACH is an index of the availability and relative attractiveness 
of teaching jobs for “literate” Mill No. 2 weavers. Hence, it is a measure 
of a very specific alternative opportunity. A significant negative relation 
between TEACH and YWH would support the hypothesis that the existence 
of an important alternative opportunity undermined the ability of man- 
agement to intensify labor. 
(17) LNPIECER, the logarithm of the average real piece rate times 
the average loom complement, is a measure of the earnings incentive to 
which a weaver could respond in any given month. Given current earnings 
incentives, workers may have chosen to work harder in order to achieve 
higher earnings, although as indicated above we would expect that different 
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workers had different trade-offs between “on-the-job leisure” and earnings. 
In contrast to the coercive managerial strategy inherent in OPW, this 
variable represents an attempt to capture the extent to which workers 
voluntarily responded in the form of work effort to real piece-rate incentives 
offered by management. (We do not directly consider here the managerial 
strategy of manipulating the piece-rate incentive in order to minimize 
costs.) 
(18) BEGEND, the total elapsed time since a weaver first entered the 
Mill No. 2 main weaveroom, is a measure of seniority as distinct from 
actual shopfloor experience. More days actually worked probably endowed 
a weaver with more physico-cognitive capacities, whereas those who 
were around longer (but not necessarily with more accumulated days 
worked) were less likely to acquiesce in intensified work than those who 
were relatively new to the weaveroom. Given the development of the 
Lowell labor supply described above, those with more seniority are likely 
to have been Yankees who placed a relatively high value on the enjoyment 
of respectable work conditions, thus limiting the acceptable level of self- 
imposed work intensity. In addition, a weaver with more seniority probably 
learned that to drive herself too hard could be self-defeating since it 
might provide a basis for management to adopt the higher levels of output 
as new output norms, paying lower piece rates to yield the same basic 
wage. The Irish apparently had little power to resist intensification. More- 
over, since being a mill worker undoubtedly represented an improvement 
over previous socioeconomic experiences for the Irish, they probably 
had less aversion to intense work than did the Yankees. With the coming 
of the Irish, the traditional Yankee opposition. to rate busting must have 
been severely tested. It is likely that those with long attachments to mill 
work who remained in the mills despite the advent of “Irish” conditions 
offered more resistance to intensification of labor than did the newcomers. 
Hence, controlling for experience, we would expect BEGEND to have 
a negative impact on YWH throughout our period. 
(19) ETHNIC is a variable that specifies the probability that a person 
is non-Irish or Irish. This variable permits us to test the hypothesis that, 
holding technology and human resource characteristics constant, the Irish 
were more susceptible to inten&fication of labor than were Yankees. A 
significant positive relation between ETHNIC and YWH would be con- 
sistent with our hypothesis that Irish workers, being more dependent on 
mill work and possessing less social power than Yankee workers, had 
less power to resist undesired intensification of labor. 
(20) ETHNICITY, the proportion ‘of weavers in any given month who 
are non-Irish (see Fig. 7), measures the extent to which “Irish conditions” 
pervaded the weaveroom, thus, according to our theoretical framework, 
subjcctitig non-Irish as well as Irish to much more oppressive social 
relations of production than those that prevailed in the ““Yankee” era. 
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Average ethnicity, January 1834-November 18.55. (All Yankee = 1, all Irish 
data available for May 1836 through March 1838. For variable definition, see 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
To test alternative hypotheses concerning the determinants of pro- 
ductivity growth in the Mill No. 2 main weaveroom, we ran pooled time- 
series cross-section regressions with output per weaver-hour as the de- 
pendent variable. In the estimation of two variants of the production 
function model that are presented below, the data were transformed (as 
mentioned previously) into deviations of individual observations from 
the historical means for each individual in the Mill No. 2 main weaveroom.‘o 
In this way, we avoid the implicit, and unwarranted, assumption that all 
individuals who worked in the weaveroom started on an equal footing 
in terms of experience and other related characteristics that might influence 
individual productivity. In other words, we do not constrain all individuals 
to have the same intercepts in the functional relationships between their 
input and output. In the presentation of the empirical results below, the 
Mat the end of each variable name indicates that the variable is measured 
in terms of deviations from the individual’s mean for each observation. 
It should be noted that the use of this method precludes the direct 
“For a mathematical justification of this procedure, see Brush (1983). The difference- 
from-means OLS estimation used in this paper is similar to that described in Hausman 
(1978, p. 1261). The deviations from means approach is equivalent to the introduction of 
separate dummy variables for each individual who appears in the data set. Our model has 
an unbalanced design because individuals are present in the sample for different lengths 
of time, and is therefore somewhat different from the standard fixed effects approach. A 
proof of the equivalence of the covariance transformation estimator with fixed effects and 
the least-squares dummy estimator (see Hsiao, 1985, Chap. 3; also Wallace and Hussain, 
1969, pp. 60, 61), however, is unaffected by the presence or absence of an unbalanced 
design. 
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inclusion in our model of variables such as individual ethnicity and literacy 
directly since the measures of these variables remain constant over time 
for any given worker, and hence there are no deviations from individual 
means. “Literacy” (whether or not a weaver signed her name in the 
payroll book) does, however, enter indirectly in the construction of our 
TEACH variable (see Appendix) and, as outlined immediately below, 
ETHNIC is utilized as an interactive variable. 
Below we present the regression results of our model with ETHNIC 
as well as FALLPRES interacted with the human capabilities and work- 
effort variables listed above. The use of FALLPRES and ETHNIC as 
interactive variables enables us to discern whether the transformations 
in the nature of the labor force from impermanent to permanent workers 
and from Yankee to Irish workers resulted in significant differences in 
the impacts of the other independent variables on output per weaver- 
hour, as well as to test the hypothesis that one or both of these trans- 
formations can be considered as altering the balance of power between 
management and workers as we have posited. 
From the mid-1840s the change in the ethnic composition of the Mill 
No. 2 main weaveroom is marked (see Fig. 7), whereas from about 1840 
there is only a slight upward trend in the relative numbers of “permanent” 
and “impermanent” workers (see Fig. 6). On the basis of the qualitative 
evidence presented in Section II, we would have expected a more pro- 
nounced upward trend in average FALLPRES after the early 1840s. It 
should be noted, however, that changes in average FALLPRES might 
give a misleading impression of changes in the underlying cross-sectional 
data that we actually use for regression analysis. In Fig. 6, for example, 
increasing permanence among one portion of the labor force could be 
masked by increasing impermanence among another portion. An ex- 
amination of the underlying data, however, failed to reveal any persistent 
movements over time in the distribution of individ~~s by values of 
FALLPRES to support such an argument. 
Even in the form of cross-sectional data, FALLPRES is, or course, 
not a direct measure of loss of “farmgirl” status. In our model the 
existence of agrarian ties serves as an alternative opportunity that permits 
workers to exert control over work conditions in the mills. But farmgirls 
who chose to remain in the mills during the summer and f&l1 months 
would not necessarily relinquish the power that the ttzreat of exit afforded 
them. Yet they would be counted as “permanent” workers. On the other 
hand, non-farmgirl operative$ who taught summer school would be correctly 
identified as “impermanent” by FALLPRES. Other non-farmgirl operatives 
may have left Mill No. 2 during the summer and fall months to visit 
friends (which would have been more difficult during the winter months) 
or to work in other mills. Moreover, a study by Dubnoff (1976) of Irish 
mill workers in Lowell has shown higher rates of absence from work by 
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Irish women than Irish men, and it may be that, for any number of 
reasons, Irish weavers in Mill No. 2 (all of whom were women) were 
taking prolonged absences from Mill No. 2 that are captured by 
FALLPRES. In any case, we do not have clear-cut transitions from 
“impermanent Yankees” to “permanent Yankees” to “permanent Irish,” 
and must even consider the experiences of “impermanent Irish.” In the 
discussion that follows, the abbreviations MI, MY, PI, and PY refer to 
impermanent Irish, impermanent Yankee, permanent Irish, and permanent 
Yankee workers, respectively. 
It should also be noted that in Regression 1 below we have not interacted 
the t variables with ETHNIC and FALLPRES. Our theoretical framework 
set out in Section III as well as our explicit inclusion of h and e variables 
in the production function lead us to posit a priori that the impact of 
these inputs per se on productivity will not differ across groups of workers. 
Regressions that were run with interactive t variables (excluding the 
monthly adjustment variables) in conjunction with interactive h and e 
variables yielded results that were not significantly different from those 
of Regression 1. Moreover, none of the coefficients of the interactive t 
variables were statistically significant, supporting our decision not to 
interact the t variables with ETHNIC and FALLPRES. But in both 
regressions-with and without interactive t variables-FALLPRES in- 
teracted with RCOTL is significant at the 5% level, lending confirmation 
to our view that cotton quality should be classified as a work-effort 
variable, not as a technical capabilities variable. 
In Regression 1 the unadjusted coefficient of determination is 0.4133 
and the adjusted coefficient of determination is 0.3368. Normally in a 
sample with over 12,000 observations, the degrees of freedom are large 
enough so that no adjustment to R2 is required. But because we have 
REGRESSION 1 
Production Function with ETHNIC and FALLPRES Interacted 
Dependent variable: YWHM, SD = 1.6677 
N = 12140, R* = 0.4133, i?” = 0.3368, SSE = 19809.16 
Independent Parameter 


















0.269 - 10.671 
0.271 -4.394 
0.265 -22.189 
0.268 - 8.633 
0.265 -7.519 
0.272 -2.193 
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0.047 0.268 0.666 
- 0.014 0.268 -0.198 
-0.018 0.263 - 0,273 
- 0.086 0.136 - 0.628 
- 0.983 0.163 1.711 
- 0.683 0.157 - 1.173 
0.067 0.301 1.229 
- 0.956 0.210 - 0.289 
-0.151 1.020 - 1.476 
0.652 0.208 0.197 
0.137 0.703 1.064 
0.602* 1.214 7.793 
0.172 0.618 1.362 
- 1.185 0.086 - 1.578 
- 0.266 0.204 -0.520 
- 1.550** 0.078 -2.290 
0.171 0.049 0.170 
0.425 0.051 0.525 
0.080 0.042 0.092 
2.379* 0.310 12.673 
-0.302** 0.670 -2.157 
- 0.266 0.280 - 1.458 
1.211 0.057 0.927 
-2.305* 0.203 - 3.584 
-0.156 0.053 -0.135 
- 14.663** 0.008 -2.033 
15.781* 0.016 3.461 
14.852** 0.008 2.144 
0.921 0.077 1.304 
- 1.330% 0.040 -2.647 
- 1.045 0.066 - 1.394 
- 0.660 0.088 -1.063 
0.183 0.074 0.384 
0.790 0.080 1.465 
0.035 0.680 0.942 
0.007 1.824 0.407 
0.046 0.543 0.798 
-3.125* 0.098 -5.114 
- 0.289 0.185 -0.743 
1.054 0.089 1.822 
-0.011 15.342 - 0.594 
- 0.006 13.568 - 1.460 
0.031 14.670 1.675 
- 6.768* 0.050 - 5.2Ql 
-0.253 0.183 - 0.404 
a.505* 0.042 6.479 
* Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
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used a fixed effects model in which all observations are deviations from 
the historical means of individuals, each individual in the sample has a 
separate intercept for the regression, adding 1345 implicit variables to 
those for which we explicitly derive coefficients. Hence the need to 
calculate an adjusted R’. 
Table 1 shows the impact on YWHM of a standard deviation change 
in the interacted (h and e) variables for each of the four groups of workers, 
classified by permanence and ethnicity.” If we (rather arbitrarily) describe 
as high an impact on productivity of over 20%, then the most strik’ing 
results in Table 1 are that LPWM has a high positive impact on productivity 
change for all four worker classifications, ETHNICITYM has a high 
negative impact for Irish only, while LNEXPADJM has a high positive 
impact and RCOTLM a high negative impact for permanent workers 
only. In addition, LNPIECERM has a medium (lo-20%) negative impact 
for all groups of workers, while BEGENDM had a medium negative 
impact for Irish and a medium positive impact for Yankees. Note that 
the impact of LNTIMEM is negative for all classifications of workers, 
not what one would expect if this variable indeed captured the contribution 
of management to productivity growth. 
In Regression 1, the only technical capabilities variables that exhibit 
significant impacts on productivity are the January through July monthly 
adjustments. The interpretation of the negative coefficients for ail of 
these variables, DlM through D7M, is that productivity in these months 
is significantly less than productivity in the excluded month, December. 
For lack of better information, we might assume that the monthly dif- 
ferences were due to the factors-humidity, backwaters, and July heat- 
mentioned above. 
Of the human capabilities variables in Regression 1, only two, both 
interactive, are statistically significant. The t ratio for LNEXPADJM 
indicates that variations in experience among impermanent Irish (MI) 
workers has no significant impact on their productivity. The statistical 
results on the interacted variables reveal, however, that the Mill No. 2 
permanent workers (both Irish and Yankee), although not Yankees taken 
as a group, are significantly different from the MI group in the positive 
direction in terms of the impact of their experience on productivity. Of 
all the variable classifications in Table 1, the two largest impacts on 
” To derive the standardized impact, we calculated a standardized coefficient for each 
h and e variable by multiplying the parameter estimate of each h and e variable in Regression 
1 by its standard deviation, and then dividing the standardized coefficient by the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable, YWHM. If we designate the standardized coefficient 
of a noninteracted variable as c,, an associated F-interacted variable as cl, and an associated 
E-interacted variable as c3, the standardized impact for MI workers is ci, for PI workers 
is c, + c2, for MY workers is c, + c3, and for PY workers is c, + c2 + cj. 
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TABLE 1 
Percentage of Standard Deviation Change in YWHM Caused by Standard Deviation 







LNTIMEM - 12.05 -21.29 -3.90 - 13,13 
LNEXPADJM 5.76 49.59 12.11 55.95 
CAPUTILM -6.12 -9.35 - 13.37 - 16.61 
SPARPAUXM 0.48 1.80 0.66 1.98 
LPWM 44.19 32.08 39.76 27.64 
RCOTLM 4.14 -23.93 3.66 -24.41 
OPWM -7.02 8.10 0.12 f5.23 
ABSENTM 4.26 1.08 0.12 -3.06 
LPQUITDM -3.48 -2.64 0.30 1.14 
TEACHM 1.44 2.22 2.94 3.72 
LNPIECERM - 18.35 -21.53 - 12.71 - 15.89 
BEGENDM - 10.13 - 14.99 17.15 12.29 
ETHNICITYM - 20.27 - 23.03 1.14 - 1.62 
productivity change are those of LNEXPADJM for PI and PY workers- 
50 and 56%, respectively. 
Capacity utilization has a negative sign, indicating that the productivity 
of MI workers is higher in cyclical troughs, but the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. The impact of declines in capacity utilization on 
the productivity of Yankee workers is, however, signmcantly different 
at the 5% level than that for the impermanent Irish, consistent with the 
evidence from the payroll books (referred to above) that individual per- 
formance was systematically monitored up to the early 1840s when Yankee 
workers predominated in the weaveroom. Table 1 shows medium negative 
impacts for both classifications of Yankee workers, but low negative 
impacts for the Irish. 
A number of the work effort coefficients are statistically significant. 
LPWM is significant with a positive sign, indicating (under the assumptions 
set out in Section III) that the work effort of the MI workers is being 
intensified by means of stretch-out. At the 5% level, permanent workers 
are significantly different from MI workers, the negative sign of the 
coefficient indicating that the labor of permanent workers is more difficult 
to intensify than that of MI workers, perhaps because of better shop- 
floor cohesion and resistance to intensification by those with more consis- 
tent attachments to the workplace. Next to the standardized impact of 
LNEXPADJM for PI and PY workers, the impacts of all four classi- 
fications of LPWM are the highest in Table 1, all with a positive sign. 
RCOTLM, the quality of cotton variable, is not significant far MI 
workers. The impact of cotton quality on permanent workers is, however, 
significantly different than its impact on MI workers in the direction of 
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added intensification, suggesting that the fact of being permanent, and 
the lessened ability to exit from worsening work conditions inherent 
therein, reduces the ability of permanent workers to avoid the intensification 
impact of inferior cotton relative to MI workers. Note that, in the presence 
of permanent workers, the relatively successful resistance to increases 
in looms per weaver may well have led management to resort to the use 
of inferior cotton in order to cut costs. Permanent workers may well 
have reacted more adversely to discrete and easily recognizable increases 
in looms per weaver than to gradual deterioration in the quality of cotton. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the standardized impacts of RCOTLM for 
PI and PY workers are of about the same relatively high negative magnitude. 
Those for MI and MY workers are also of about the same magnitude, 
but relatively low and positive. 
The overseers per worker variable for MI workers is significant at the 
5% level with a negative sign, indicating that increases in overseers per 
worker may have been a specific managerial response to particular dif- 
ficulties in getting high levels of productivity (relative to the prevailing 
norm) out of MI workers. In Table 1, MI workers are the only group 
for whom the impact of OPWM on productivity change is negative. An 
increased ratio of overseers to MI workers may have been needed because 
impermanent Irish lacked the necessary physico-cognitive capacities to 
perform factory work-a human capabilities factor. Alternatively, the 
problem may have been the integration of impermanent Irish into already 
existing conditions of very high levels of work intensity. In either case, 
the statistical results clearly indicate a different role of overseers for MI 
workers than for the other groups: at the 1% level for permanent workers 
and at the 5% level for Yankee workers the impact of OPWM on YWHM 
differs significantly from its impact for MI workers, and the coefficients 
of both interacted variables have positive signs. By the same token, it 
is possible (although by no means statistically proven) that the main 
function of overseers for PI, MY, and PY workers was to ensure high 
levels of work effort, holding human capabilities constant. 
The coefficient of the absenteeism variable, ABSENTM, is not significant 
for MI workers. But the impact of this variable on permanent workers 
is significantly different than its impact on MI workers with a negative 
sign, suggesting to us that, for any given level of temporary separations 
as measured by ABSENTM, permanent workers had less power to control 
the pace of work than impermanent workers, presumably because of 
their higher dependence on mill work for earning a living. All of the 
standardized impacts of ABSENTM in Table 1, however, are relatively 
low. 
The purpose of LNPIECERM is to discern whether workers increased 
their levels of work effort in response to positive incentives-in this case 
increases in real income for a given level of output-rather than in 
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response to negative incentives, particularly the threat of job loss. The 
existence of such noncoerced increases in work effort, leading to higher 
levels of productivity, would be supported by a positive coefficient on 
LNPIECERM. The highly significant, but negative, coefficient for MI 
workers rules out this positive incentive as an explanation of their pro- 
ductivity performance. Indeed the negative sign lends support to the 
contrary hypothesis of unremunerated intensification of labor: as indicated 
for the period from 1848 through 18.55 in Figs. 1 and 2, as productivity 
went up, real piece rates were cut even to the point where real hourly 
wages declined. Moreover, permanent workers are not statistically different 
than MI workers in this regard. Unlike the other two coefficients in the 
group, however, the coefficient on ELNPIECERM is positive and just 
shy of being significant at the 5% level, suggesting that Yankee workers 
responded more positively to income incentives than did MI workers. 
Nevertheless, in Table 1 all the standardized impacts for this variable 
have negative signs, 
Finally, and of utmost significance given all the other factors that have 
been held constant, the movement of the ethnic composition of the 
weaveroom toward more Irish (the inverse of ETHNICITYM) has a 
highly significant positive impact on the productivity of MI workers. 
Permanent workers as a group cannot be distinguished from MI workers, 
but Yankee workers as a group can be. In Table 1, there is a marked 
difference in the standardized impacts of ETHNICITYM for Irish and 
Yankee workers, respectively, indicating the ability of Yankees to resist 
being subjected to “Irish conditions” of stretch-out and speed-up in the 
early 1850s when the ethnic composition of the weaveroom was shifting 
heavily to Irish. Similarly, the highly significant positive coefficient of 
EETHNICITYM can be interpreted to mean that, with movements of 
ethnic composition toward more Irish, Yankee workers were better able 
to resist intensification of labor. 
F tests on all the ETHNIC interactive variables taken together and 
all the FALLPRES interactive variables taken together in the regression 
above show both sets of variables to be significant at the 1% level. For 
purposes of comparison, however, we think that it is useful to estimate 
the production function with only ETHNIC as an interactive variable, 
particularly since we are much more confident that our measure of ETHNIC 
actually distinguishes between Yankee and Irish workers than that our 
measure of FALLPRES actually distinguishes between workers with and 
without agmrian ties (or other alternative opportunities such as summer 
school teaching), the structural distinction that the variable was originally 
designed to capture. 
In Regression 2, the most notable impacts on the t variables caused 
by dropping the FALLPRES interactive variables from Regression 1 are 
that D7M (July) and DSM (August) are now significant at the 1% level. 
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REGRESSION 2 
Production Function with ETHNIC Interacted 
Dependent Variable: YWHM, SD = 1.6677 
N = 12140, RZ = 0.4049, wz = 0.3270, SSE = 20093.66 
Independent Parameter 
variable estimate SD T ratio 
DIM - 0.3s7* 0.265 
D2M - 0.662” 0.269 
D3M - 0.267* 0.271 
D4M - 1.502” 0.265 
D5M -0.561* 0.268 
D6M -0..517* 0.265 
D7M -0.265* 0.272 
DSM -0.194” 0.270 
D9M -0.019 0.268 
DlOM - 0.080 0.268 
DllM - 0.069 0.263 
DTECHlM -0.101 0.136 
DTECH2M 0.549 0.163 
DTCOT2M - 0.289 0.157 
WPOWM 0.064 0.301 
LNTIMEM 1.145 0.210 
ELNTIMEM - 1.558 0.208 
LNEXPADJM 0.485% 0.703 
ELNEXPADJM 0.124 0.618 
CAPUTILM - 1.546** 0.086 
ECAPUTILM - 1.569** 0.078 
SPARPAUXM 0.503 0.049 
ESPARPAUXM - 0.079 0.042 
LPWM 2.205* 0.310 
ELPWM -0.244 0.280 
RCOTLM - 1.401 0.057 
ERCOTLM 0.599 0.053 
OPWM - 1.978 0.008 
EOPWM 12.740 0.008 
ABSENTM 1.959* 0.077 
EABSENTM - 1.5.50** 0.066 
LPQUITDM - 0.494 0.088 
ELPQUITDM 0.749 0.080 
TEACHM 0.017 0.680 
ETEACHM 0.058 0.543 
LNPIECERM -3.393* 0.098 
ELNPIECERM 1.053 0.089 
BEGENDM -0.018 15.342 
EBEGENDM 0.037** 14.670 
ETHNICITYM -7.192* 0.050 










































* Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
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The coefficients on D9M, DlOM, and DllM (September, October, No- 
vember) also appear to have been altered more than the coefficients on 
DlM through D6M (January through June). Since FALLPRES measures 
differences among workers in regularity of employment during the July- 
November periods, some of the impact of these differences on productivity 
may well be captured by the monthly adjustment variables with the 
exclusion of the FALLPRES interactives. 
Table 2 summarizes the standardized impacts of the h and e variables. 
For both Irish and Yankees, LNEXPADJM and LPWM have high positive 
impacts on productivity change. ETHNICITYM has a high negative 
impact for Irish, while LNPIECERM has a,medium negative impact for 
both groups. BEGENDM has a medium negative impact on both groups, 
but in opposite directions. 
The impact of individual experience is clear-cut in Regression 2. The 
coefficient of LNEXPADJM refers to Irish workers in general, and is 
significant at the 1% level with a positive sign. Moreover, Yankee workers 
are not significantly different than Irish workers, and the sign of 
ELNEXPADJM is also positive. The positive standardized impacts of 
LNEXPADJM are both over 20%. 
The coefficient of CAPUTILM is now significant at the 5% level with 
a negative sign, indicating that on average the productivity of Irish workers 
rose in cyclical troughs. Yankee workers are significantly different from 
Irish workers at the 5% level, and the negative sign indicates that for 
these workers the productivity increases in cyclical downturns were even 
stronger than for Irish workers. 
The coefficient of LPWM is significant at the 1% level and positive. 
As in Regression 1, this finding is consistent with the hypothesis that 
TABLE 2 
Percentage of Standard Deviation Change in YWHM Caused by Standard Deviation 
Change in Independent Variable by Ethnicity of Worker 
Irish Yankee 
LNTIMEM 14.39 -5.04 
LNEXPADJM 20.45 25.06 
CAPUTILM -7.98 -15.29 
SPARPAUXM 1.50 1.32 
LPWM 41.02 36.94 
RCOTLM -4.80 -2.88 
OPWM -0.96 .5.I6 
ABSENTM 9.05 2.94 
LPQUITDM -2.58 1.02 
TEACHM 0.72 2.58 
LNPIECERM -19.97 - 14.33 
BEGENDM -16.55 16.01 
ETHNICITYM -21.59 -0.24 
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productivity gains by Irish were the result of the intensification of their 
labor by means of stretch-out. The coefficient of ELPWM indicates that 
Yankees as a group were not significantly different from the Irish in 
terms of the impact of stretch-out on productivity. For both Irish and 
Yankees, the highest standardized impact is associated with changes in 
LPWM. 
Neither of the coefficients of RCOTLM or ERCOTLM is statistically 
significant. Comparing these results with the cotton quality findings in 
Regression 1 suggests that if inferior cotton was used by management 
in contexts where it had more power to intensify labor, then it was 
foisted on permanent workers as a group rather than on the Irish as a 
group or the Yankees as a group. In Regression 1, the overseers per 
worker variable is significant for impermanent Irish whereas in Regression 
2 it is not significant for the Irish as a group, reinforcing the previous 
interpretation that it was the impermanence of the Irish rather than being 
Irish itself which posed particular productivity problems in the weaveroom. 
The impact of the exclusion of the FALLPRES interactives on 
ABSENTM are particularly interesting. In Regression 1, the coefficient 
of ABSENTM, referring to the productivity impact of temporary quits 
for MI workers, is not significant, but in Regression 2 the coefficient 
referring to the same relationship for Irish workers in general is highly 
significant. In both cases, the sign of the coefficient is positive, indicating 
that temporary separations by Irish gave them no power to control the 
pace of work. But the coefficient of EABSENTM shows that at the 5% 
level Yankee workers are significantly different than Irish workers, in 
the negative direction: high levels of temporary mobility in and out of 
the Mill No. 2 main weaveroom apparently gave the Yankee workers 
relatively more power to control the pace of work than Irish workers. 
The standardized impacts shown in Table 2 are, however, relatively small 
for both groups of workers. 
As for positiveincentives, the coefficient of LNPIECERM in Regression 
2 indicates that all Irish were in the same unfortunate position as im- 
permanent Irish as revealed by Regression 1: a highly significant negative 
relation between real income incentives and productivity. Analogous to 
Regression 1, Yankee workers cannot be distinguished from Irish workers 
at the 5% level. For both Irish and Yankees, the standardized impacts 
of LNPIECERM are negative at a relatively medium (but for Irish bordering 
on high) level. 
Consistent with the findings in Table 1, the impact of BEGENDM is 
negative for Irish and positive for Yankees, both at a medium level. In 
Regression 2, BEGENDM is not statistically significant but the ETHNIC 
interactive is significant at the 5% level. These results suggest that “sen- 
iority” led the Yankees to work harder but the Irish to restrict their 
output, perhaps reflecting the greater ability of employers to inflict un- 
remunerated intensification on the foreign-born workers. 
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Finally, the highly significant negative coefficient of ETHNICITYM 
shows that, for Irish workers at least, an upward trend of productivity 
in the Mill No. 2 main weaveroom is highly correlated with the transition 
from “Yankee” to “Irish” production relations. For Irish workers, the 
standardized impact of ETHNICITYM is negative, more than offsetting 
the impact of the individual experience variable, LNEXPADJM. The 
significant positive coefficient of EETHNICITYM indicates that in this 
transition, the performance of Yankee workers can be distinguished from 
that of Irish, the general implication being that the social conditions 
inherent in “average ethnicity” in a given historical period can have a 
significant impact on observed productivity performance. 
In our view, the regression results lend support to both the “learning- 
by-doing” and the “production-relations” hypotheses. What can we then 
say about the relative impacts of technical, human capabilities, and work- 
effort factors in the determination of productivity change? The inevitable 
problem of multicollinearity among the independent variables precludes 
us from giving a definitive answer to this question. We cannot say precisely 
how much of the variance a particular variable or group of variables 
explains. But one way to assess the relative impacts of the different 
variable classifications that takes multicollinearity into account is to eal- 
culate the additions to fi” when the results of regressions containing 
different combinations of classifications are compared. For example, if 
&l, I?;.,, I?;.,,, I?&, and 8&,e are compared, (.&,e - &i”,.,) gives us 
a lower-bound estimate and l?& an upper-bound estimate of the inde- 
pendent impact of e variables, while (&the - &&,) gives us a Iower- 
bound estimate and I?$, an upper-bound estimate of the independent 
impact of h variables. Table 3 shows the lower- and upper-bound estimates 
of percentages of R2 explained by variable classifications. 
These results suggest that the production-relations hypothesis should 
be given at least as much attention as the learning-by-doing hypothesis 
in research into the “Horndal effect.” There is more to the process of 
labor productivity growth than the technical development of inputs. Social 
influences on productivity growth must be considered as ‘well. 
TABLE 3 
Lower-Bound and Upper-Bound Estimates of Variance Explained by Variable 
Classifications (Percent) 
Regression 1 Regression 2 
Variable classification Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound 
1 5.19 5.37 5.13 5.89 
h 4.69 13.65 4.07 11.18 
e 11.04 23.27 10.94 21.76 
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Despite the extreme microeconomic nature of our data set, we recognize 
that there is ample room for debate over the measurement and interpretation 
of all three classifications of variables in our study. Our microeconomic 
approach, however, at least brings the issue of the socio-technical nature 
of production into clear view rather than burying the sources of productivity 
growth within aggregated data, to be barely noticed, nevermind understood. 
We have constructed variables in particular ways to quantify many technical 
and social phenomena that are not easily measured and that might be 
measured in other ways. We have placed specific interpretations on these 
variables that are suggested by our theory of the production process. 
Other theories and interpretations are possible. Given our general theoretical 
framework and given the ways we have chosen to construct, interpret, 
and classify our variables, we are satisified that we have generated mean- 
ingful statistical results. The results are meaningful not because of the 
degree of statistical significance per se, but rather because they support 
our contention that further research and debate over the theory, mea- 
surement, and interpretation of the social and technical determinants of 
productivity growth are in order. 
In particular, it should be recognized that we still do not have a direct 
measure of the intensity of labor, and probably never will. But measurement 
problems should not damn the attempt to incorporate the notion of work 
effort into the production function. On the contrary, by confronting these 
problems, we can, at a minimum, develop an enlightened skepticism of 
conclusions drawn from more aggregated analyses, particularly when no 
attempt has been made to identify or distinguish between the impacts 
of social and technical factors on productivity. 
V. SOME BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
The development of theory and the development of empirical work 
must go hand in hand. For the empirical issues that have been addressed 
in this paper, neoclassical theory is not much help. A perspective that 
assumes that the firm simply responds to the dictates of the market while 
taking technology as given cannot possibly provide us with much insight 
into the role of social relationships and the exercise of power in an 
economic system. Over a century ago, Marx argued that the interaction 
of the relations and forces of production was the key to understanding 
capitalist development. One need not accept Marx’s conclusions (Lazonick, 
1983a) to agree that this is a proposition worth exploring rather than 
ignoring. In our view, the present study lends empirical support to the 
hypothesis that productivity outcomes are significantly affected by who 
has power over whom in the production process and how those who 
possess power choose to utilize it. 
In particular, this study supports the proposition that “labor scarcity” 
puts power in the hands (or more accurately the feet) of workers. As a 
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consequence, labor scarcity will have an impact on the choice of technique, 
be it the choice of the quality of raw material (e.g., cotton), the choice 
of number of machines (e.g., looms) per worker, or the introduction of 
a new technology (i.e., better rather than simply more machinery). We 
would agree that, generally speaking, managers of capitalist firms make 
rational choices among alternative available techniques. But we would 
argue that they do not make these choices solely according to relative 
factor prices.” Conditions of labor scarcity endow the relevant workers 
with the power not only to demand higher wages but also to exercise 
more control over the pace of work in the production process. We would 
argue that it is the impact of labor scarcity on productivity, not just its 
impact on wages, that leads capitalists to look for skill-displacing techniques 
that will make them less dependent on “scarce” labor. 
Alternatively, in conditions of “labor abundance”-as with the coming 
of the Irish to the vicinity of Lowell-capitalists will not only reap the 
benefits of lower wages, but will also take advantage of the situation to 
introduce more effort-intensive production techniques; that is techniques 
which require more work effort (either in the form of more extensive or 
intensive use of labor power) to achieve the same amount of output. 
One example is the propensity of capitalists to foist i~f~~or cotton on 
more dependent workers. Another example is the introduction of more 
looms per worker without sufficient slowing of the looms to maintain 
work effort constant. 
Lacking a theory of the role of work effort in the production function, 
economists and economic historians have been led to argue that an 
increase in the number of looms per worker makes workers more productive 
because they now have more capital with which to work (see for example, 
McCouldrick, 1968, pp. 38-40). But such an argument ignores the com- 
plementarity of capital and labor inputs in production, and confuses more 
capital with better capital. If a certain number of workers are given more 
looms of the same quality, more output can only result from the inten- 
sification of their labor, an outcome that is more likely to be achieved 
in conditions of labor abundance. It is only if these workers are given 
“better” looms-that is, looms that permit them to produce more output 
with the same input of work effort-that their lalbor will be aided by the 
“choice of technique.” And, in contrast to increased capital-labor ratios 
resulting from stretch-outs, effort-decreasing technical change resulting 
from the introduction of better machinery is more likely to occur not in 
periods of labor abundance, but rather in periods of labor scarcity. One 
implication of our analysis is that economists had best begin to recognize 
the differences between qualitative and quantitative changes in ‘capital- 
” For debate over choice of technique in early U.S. manufacturing sole!y in terms of 
relative factor prices. see, for example, Temin (1966) and Fogel (1967). 
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labor ratios if they want to understand productivity growth and technological 
change. 
Wages are neither entirely independent nor uniquely related to the 
intensity of labor. “External” wages function to attract workers into the 
workplace, but “internal” wages are intended to entice work out of 
workers once they are there. If, under conditions of labor abundance, 
an employer seeks to eliminate some or all internal earnings premiums 
so as to pay workers an amount closer to the external wage, an attempt 
by the workers to restrict output is the likely result. Alternatively, conditions 
of labor scarcity will inhibit managerial attempts to eliminate earnings 
premiums, and hence may lead workers to respond more positively to 
wage incentives that are tied to output. The intensity of work effort, and 
with it productivity, will then be determined by the “on-the-job” utility- 
maximizing preferences of workers, and not by the power of employers 
to deny any given worker a job. In other words, any observed relation 
between work effort and pay will depend in part on the structure of 
social power that characterizes the prevailing social relations of production. 
Moreover, given fixed capital, unit capital costs, and hence the return 
on invested capital, depend to some extent on work effort applied in 
combination with that capital (Lazonick, 1984). Factor prices are an 
outcome of the social relations of production as well as a precondition 
for the choice of technique. To explain not only productivity but also 
profitability, the interactions of factor prices, technology, and social 
organization must be analyzed in terms of a dynamic historical process. 
The basic argument of this study is that alternative opportunities for 
attaining a “living” are important determinants of both the productivity 
of individual workers and the wages they receive. If different groups of 
workers such as Yankees or Irish-or men or women-face distinctly 
different alternative opportunities at a point in time or over time, we 
can expect that the unit labor cost outcomes across these groups of 
workers will be markedly different. It may be ill-advised, therefore, to 
impute productivity differences to wage differences of different segments 
of the labor force, as is done for example by both sides of a recent 
debate on productivity in the early New England textile industry (David, 
1975, Chap. 2; Nickless, 1979). In our study, as the Irish entered the 
Mill No. 2 main weaveroom, real wages fell while labor productivity 
rose-if one’s measure of “labor quality” is real wages, the Irish were 
“lower quality” workers than Yankees, but if one’s measure of “labor 
quality” is labor productivity the Irish were “higher quality” workers. 
The higher levels of productivity achieved with the coming of the Irish 
were not, moreover, because the Irish had more “human capital” than 
the Yankees; in all probability they had less. If, on the basis of the 
productivity criterion, the Irish were “higher quality” workers than the 
Yankees, it was because employers found it easier to intensify their 
labor. 
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Economists have to rethink the whole concept of exploitation. They 
might start by going back to the distinction, put forth by Marx over a 
century ago, between the capacity to work and work actually performed, 
given the wage. The neoclassical notion of exploitation as consisting of 
wages below the value of the marginal product of labor has little to 
commend it. In the Marxian model, the ability of employers to exploit 
workers depends upon the existence of a reserve army of labor; that is, 
a situation where the labor demand curve intersects a perfectly elastic 
segment of the labor supply curve (Lazonick, 1983a). Given technology 
and human capabilities, productivity will depend upon the intensity of 
labor achieved in production. Given the supply price of labor, exploitation 
will depend on the degree of intensification. Higher degrees of intensification 
will shift the marginal product of labor curve upwards. Given the demand 
for labor curve (determined in part by the degree of intensification), the 
fact that profit-maximizing capitalists employ additional units of labor to 
the point where the market wage just equals the value of the marginal 
product of labor is incidental to the analysis of exploitation. 
Finally, with the intrusion of conflict, power relations, and variations 
in work effort into the theory of production, the notion of “efficiency” 
that is so central to neoclassical orthodoxy ceases to be an objective 
measure of performance capability or welfare. The possibility that pro- 
ductivity may be raised by unremunerated intensification of labor should 
lead us to ask: efficient for whom? In the production process, the notion 
of “Pareto-optimal” moves, where nobody is made worse off than before, 
is only tenable if the structure of relative power is taken as given and 
remains unchanged. As often as not, references to “efficient” or “Pareto- 
optimal” autcomes mean only that the economist either views the pro- 
duction function as technically determined or considers a particular struc- 
ture of production relations as ideal. 
APPENDIX: DEFINITION OF VARlABLES 
All variables refer to monthly observations for individual weavers in 
the Lawrence Mill No. 2 main weaveroom unless otherwise indicated. 
Dependent variable: YWH = Output per weaver-hour of type C cloth. 
Independent variables: 
(1) DI, . , ., Dll = monthly adjustments for variations in technical 
capability, where Dl = 1 if January, 0 otherwise; D2 = 1 if February, 
0 otherwise; . . .; DII = 1 if November, 0 otherwise. 
Dryer weather exacerbated problems of yarn breakages, holding other 
factors constant. Mean monthly measures of relative humidity for the 
Boston area averaged over the years 1886 through I890 (for which the 
data are first available) were January, 73.1; February, 72.4; March, 70.8; 
April, 67.1; May, 74.9; June, 77.1; July, 78.8; August, 79.4; September, 
82.9; October, 78.1; November, 74.9; December, 72.7. Blrne HilZ Mete- 
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orological Observatory, Mudge: Boston, 1886 and Wilson: Cambridge, 
1887-1890. 
(2) DTECHl = a dummy variable to control for the introduction of 
a let-off motion on the looms in May 1835; 0 for every month prior to 
May 1835, 1 for May 1835 and every month thereafter. 
Evidence on the introduction of the let-off motion and details of its 
mode of operation and function can be found in Lawrence Manufacturing 
Company records, Baker Library, Manuscripts Division, MAB-1, Letters 
from William Austin to Henry Hall, March 5, 1835 and May 1, 1835; 
James Montgomery, A Practical Detail of the Cotton Manufacture of 
the U.S.A. Compared with that of Great Britain, Niven: Glasgow, 1840, 
103; Richard Marsden, Cotton Weaving, Bell: London, 1895, 72; Amasa 
Stone versus William and Amasa Sprague, Depositions from the trial, 
Rhode Island District Court, June Term 1840 at Newport, Rhode Island, 
located at Archives Branch, Federal Archives and Records Center, National 
Archives, Waltham, Massachusetts. 
(3) DTECH2 = a dummy variable to control for the introduction of 
a new type of cotton picker into the mills of the Lawrence Manufacturing 
Company in August 1844; 0 for every month prior to August 1844, 1 for 
August 1844 and every month thereafter. 
Evidence on the introduction of these cotton pickers into the Lawrence 
mills can be found in Lawrence Mfg. Co., MA-l, Letter from Henry 
Hall to William Aiken, September 26, 1845; BB-2, Ledgers, August 1844 
and August 1845. 
(4) DCOT2 = the cotton quality variable, RCOTL (defined below), 
interacted with DTECH2. 
(5) WPOW = a dummy variable to control for known water power 
shortages for the Lowell mills; 1 for months during which power shortages 
occurred, 0 for all other months. 
The identification of these power shortages is based upon an exhaustive 
search of the 79-volume collection of bound letters, most of them written 
to or by James B. Francis, the hydraulic engineer at the Lowell Locks 
and Canals. Proprietors of Locks and Canals records, Manuscripts Division, 
A-l through A-79. The evidence is summarized in Linda Gray, Water 
Power at Lowell, photocopy, Harvard University, August 1983. There 
is evidence for ,water power shortages in 1838, 1839, 1840, 1849, and 
1852. In addition, we included a known power shortage that occurred 
in 1846 due to a combination of seasonal shortage and increased demand 
for power as new mills were opened. Subsequently the supply of water 
power was expanded to meet this increased demand by the building of 
the Northern Canal. Where the precise duration of the power shortage 
was not cited in the Francis letters, a graph of capacity utilization was 
used to determine how many months on either side of the month cited 
were likely to have had water shortages. In addition the late summer 
THE HORNDAL EFFECT 89 
and fall months of 1841 were so similar to periods of known shortage 
that occurred in the previous 3 years that we decided to in&de them 
as well. September and October of 1845 were also included as power 
shortage months because capacity utilization during these months exhibited 
similar characteristics to capacity utilization during the power shortage 
months of 1846. Power shortage months are 183&(08,09,10), 
1839(07,08,Q9,10,11), 1840(07,08,09,10), 1841(08,09,10,11), 1845(09,10), 
1846(08,09,10,11,12), 1847(01), 1849(07,08,09,10), 1852(08,09,10,11). 
(6) LNTIME = a measure of learning by doing by Mill No. 2 = 
logarithm of the cumulative months since Lawrence Mill No. 2 opened 
for operation in January 1834. 
(7) LNEXPADJ = a measure of learning by doing by individual weavers 
= logarithm of number of cumulative days worked by each weaver whose 
name appears on the payroll in any given month. 
There is a 2-year gap in the payroll records between April 1836 and 
April 1838. The experience variable is therefore adjusted to add days of 
experience for those workers who were in the weaveroom during both 
April 1836 and April 1838. Since the entire mill was shut down for 9 
months during the intervening period, we need not adjust for that portion 
of the gap. We assume also that the average worker under consideration 
was away from the mill for an additional month before and after the 
shutdown, leaving 13 months of potential experience that might be ascribed 
to each worker. Thirteen months (at an average of 27 days per month) 
are then multiplied by the individual worker’s absent rate in April 1838 
to yield the days of experience imputed to the payroll-gap period. 
(8) CAPUTIL = a measure of capacity utilization during any given 
month = the proportion of total loom capacity utilized each month = 
[(A*B)+(C*B*D)]/( 144*:E), where 
A = total ‘days worked by piecehands in a given month, 
B = average loom complement of piecehands in that month, 
C = total days worked by sparehands in that month, 
D = ratio of sparehand productivity to piecehand productivity in that 
month, 
E = Mill No. 2 working days in that month, 
and 144 is the number of looms in the Mill No. 2 main weaveroom. 
Average daily output per sparehand during any given month is defined 
as total Mill No. 2 output minus the output of ati Mill No. 2 weaving 
piecehands (in both main and auxiliary rooms), divided by the total 
number of sparehand days worked during the month. Our measure of 
capacity utilization is rendered inexact by the facts that we know neither 
the precise number of sparehands nor the precise number of looms tended 
by sparehands working in the main weaveroom. We estimate these values 
and use them to construct our measure of capacity utilization. The fact 
that CAPUTIL exceeds 1.0 from time to time (see Fig. 3) despite fixed 
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loom capacity reflects measurement errors in our estimation of these 
factors. Nevertheless, we believe that CAPUTIL provides a very good 
index of actual capacity utilization in the Mill No. 2 weaveroom from 
1834 through 1855. 
(9) SPARPAUX = the number of auxiliury sparehands per piecehand 
in any given month = [A(l-@I/C, where 
A = total days worked by sparehands in a given month, 
B = ratio of sparehand productivity to piecehand productivity in that 
month, 
C = total days worked by piecehands in that month. 
This measure of sparehands per piecehand nets out sparehands who 
might have been themselves tending looms, and therefore could not have 
been providing auxiliary services to piecehands. 
(10) LPW = average number of looms tended by each weaver in a 
given month. 
We do not in fact have direct evidence on looms per weaver. LPW 
was derived from information on the piece rates paid at any point in 
time as well as the trend in average number of looms per weaver for 
the weaveroom. Combining this trend with changes in piece rates over 
time allows us to distinguish between piece-rate cuts that were wage 
reductions per se and piece-rate cuts that were due to workers tending 
more looms. Benchmarks from sources internal to Lowell mills, newspaper 
accounts, and outside observers at Lowell corroborated our decisions 
of which piece rates to link to which loom complements. Figure 4 shows 
the average number of looms per weaver in any given month. 
(11) RCOTL = an index of the quality of cotton actually used in main 
weaveroom production in any given month = the ratio of the price paid 
per pound of cotton, net of the cost of freight, insurance, and drayage, 
to the monthly price per pound of standard quality Upland cotton in 
New York. 
Upland cotton prices are from Arthur H. Cole, Wholesale Commodity 
Prices in the U.S., 1700-1861, Harvard UP: Cambridge, 1938. The price 
paid by the mill for cotton, the weight of cotton shipped, as well as 
freight, insurance, and drayage charges are reported semiannually in 
Lawrence Mfg. Co. records, HA-2. Hence, the net price that the mill 
paid for cotton that is derived from these records is an average of the 
current month and the previous 5 months. The data from the semiannual 
accounts are interpolated to yield monthly data. The resulting series is 
lagged 3 months to represent the middle of the biannual reporting period. 
In order to match this derivation of the price that the mill paid for cotton 
in any given month as closely as possible to the New York price of 
standard quality (“middling”) Upland cotton that was in effect when this 
cotton was purchased (and in the process adjust as well for delivery time 
from New York, New Orleans, and Charleston to Lowell), we calculated 
THE HORNDAL EFFECT 91 
the correlation coefficients of the mill’s net price of cotton at time of 
purchase with the current New York Uplands cotton price, as well as 
with the New York price lagged 1 month through 5 months. 
Monthly lag in the New York price of cotton 
0 1 2 3 4 S 
Correlation ____ ___ ___ ___ ~ 
coefficient 0.87747 0.88916 0.89436 0.89434 0.88777 0.87822 
These coefficients suggest that a 2- to 3-month lag on the New York 
cotton price matches the mill’s current net cotton price derived from the 
biannual records. In order to allow for this lag while at the same time 
making the form of the New York price series similar to the interpolated 
mill price series, we constructed a New York price series based upon 
a 6-month running average of the current month and 5 lagged months. 
(12) OPW = overseers per worker (piecehands plus sparehandsj in 
any given month. 
(13) ABSENT = a measure of temporary separations while employed 
in the Mill No. 2 main weaveroom for individual weavers present in any 
given month = the ratio of the total number of workdays absent to the 
total number of workdays possible for every month in which a weaver 
worked at least 1 day. 
(14) FALLPRES = a measure of the extent to which weavers depart 
temporarily for the summer and fall months = the number of days present 
in all prior mid-June through mid-November periods (calendar payroll 
months July through November) as a proportion af the total workdays 
possible over all prior mid-June through mid-November periods since 
that weaver first entered the Mill No. 2 main weaveroom. 
Either the same values are entered from December through June of 
the current stint in the weaveroom, or zero is entered until a weaver 
has been present for at least 1 day during a July to November period. 
During July through November the value of FALLPRES is recalculated 
from month to month if the worker is present in any one of the months. 
(15) LPQUITD = the proportion of weavers who quit the Mill No. 2 
main weaveroom permanently in any given month = A - B, if B > 0, 
and LPW,, > LPW,* , or CAPUTIL,, < CAPUTIL,.* ; otherwise A; 
where 
A= 
permanent separations in t - 1 
number of weavers who worked in f - 1’ 
B = (weaver positions in t - 2) - (weaver positions in t - 1) 
weaver positions in t - 2 
5 
t = current month. 
The proportion of permanent separations (A) has been adjusted by 
deducting any decrease in the stock of permanent positions available 
92 LAZONICK AND BRUSH 
from the previous month that are clearly the result of underutilization 
of capacity or increases in loom complements (B), so that A - B reflects 
only voluntary quits and does not include layoffs. Some of the decreases 
in the stock of permanent positions may have been due to absolute labor 
shortages (which, judging from managerial correspondence, did occur at 
times), and hence should not be counted as permanent layoffs. We have 
not, therefore, deducted decreases in the stock of permanent positions 
if both capacity utilization was rising and the number of looms per weaver 
was not increasing. We have been unable to make an adjustment for 
workers who transferred to other rooms or mills of the Lawrence Man- 
ufacturing Company. 
(16) TEACH = an index of the remuneration and relative availability 
of teaching jobs for “literate” weavers = [LIT*(A +B)]/C 
A = number of positions for female teachers in Massachusetts in a 
given month, 
B = wages of female teachers in Massachusetts in that month, 
C = number of positions for female operatives in Lowell in that month, 
and 
LIT = a measure of literacy = 1 if a weaver manifests the ability to 
sign her name, 0 if otherwise. 
Data on numbers of female teachers from 1833-1834 to 1836-1837 and 
from 1838-1839 through the end of our period, and data on wages of 
female teachers for 1836-1837 and from 1838-1839 to the end of our 
period can be found in the Annual Reports of the Massachusetts Board 
of Education. Wage data for 1833-1834 through 1835-1836 were gathered 
from the manuscript material at the Massachusetts State House Archives. 
But data for 1837-1838 do not appear to be available in either published 
or manuscript form, and may never have been collected. Since 1837- 
1838 was a year for which Lawrence payroll records were also missing, 
only months from April through August 1838 had missing information. 
An average of the values for wages and teaching positions in 1836-1837 
and 1838-1839 were used for these months. For all other months, annual 
data were converted to monthly data by assigning the same value for 
the entire school year starting in September and ending in August. 
Data on the number of female workers in Lowell come from the Annual 
Statistics of Manufacturing in Lowell, VOX Populi: Lowell (“Statistics 
of Lowell Manufacturers”). The yearly figures were assumed to apply 
to January of that year, and were then converted to monthly data by 
interpolation. 
“Literacy” is determined by whether or not a worker manifested the 
ability to sign her name in the payroll books. If a worker made a mark 
in the shape of a cursive L-Z-it generally meant that she was present 
at the mill on payday but could not sign her name. If she was not present, 
the Mill Agent would write an X or a friend might sign for her, A cursive 
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L is therefore the most distinctive indication that we possess of “illiteracy” 
while repeated signatures are the most distinctive indication of “literacy.” 
(17) LNPIECER = a measure of earnings incentives for weavers in 
any given month = the logarithm of the average real piece rate times 
the average loom complement = log {[(A*B) -+ Cl/D), where 
A = average loom complement in a given month, 
B = total piece earnings in that month, 
C = total yards produced by piecehands in that month, and 
D = 0.01 (price index), where the price index used is Arthur Cole’s 
“All Commodity Index of Wholesale Prices,” in Cole, Wholesale 
Commodity Prices. 
(18) BEGEND = a measure of seniority = in a given month, the total 
elapsed time since a weaver first entered the Mill No. 2 main weaveroom. 
(19) ETHNIC = ethnicity = the probability that a person is non-Irish. 
(20) ETHNICITY = a measure of the ethnic composition (that is, 
“Yankeeness”) of the main weaveroom = the proportion of weavers in 
any given month who are non-Irish. 
The ethnicity of workers at Lawrence Manufacturing Company is un- 
known because register books that may have contained such information 
(as, for example, Dublin used for the Hamilton mills in Women at Work) 
have not survived. We therefore had to estimate the probability that a 
given name in our data base is Irish or non-Irish. Virtually all non-Irish 
workers in our data base were either English, Scottish, or American- 
born of British ancestry. For the sake of brevity (although not complete 
descriptive accuracy) we have labeled all these non-Irish as “Yankees.” 
To estimate these probabilities, we have drawn upon four relevant 
data sets in which the ethnicity of particular individuals is known. 
Data sets used’to determine ethnicity 
Set 1” Set 2’ Set 3 Set 4d Total 
Last names 
Irish 27,746 345 292 405 28,788 
Non-Irish 9,525 830 263 10,375 20,993 
Unknown 2,895 
Total 49,781 
Women’s first names 
Irish 291 226 517 
Non-Irish 664 199 863 
Total 2 
a This data set was supplied by the Philadelphia Social History Project, 
University of Pennsylvania (funded by the National Institute of Mental 
Health, National Science Foundation, National Endowment for the Hu- 
manities, and the National Institute of Child Health and Human Devel- 
op’ment). It contains names and ethnicities of Philadelphia region males, 
18 years of age and older, from the 1850 census manuscripts. Henry 
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Williams, Assistant Director of the Project, provided supplementary advice, 
including the warning that the list of 9525 “non-Irish” names contains 
a “not insignificant number of second generation Irish.” Since the census 
was made in 1850, any second generation 18+ males would have had 
to have been born in the United States before 1832, a time at which 
there were relatively few Irish in the country. Hence we decided to leave 
the file as is rather than risk even greater distortion of the results by 
seeking to identify the second-generation Irish. 
b The Murray Center at Harvard University stores the data files that 
Thomas Dublin prepared for Women at Work (Columbia UP, 1979). The 
file that was used here includes all workers at the Hamilton Mfg. Co. 
who were present in August 1850, from which we selected only those 
individuals with known ethnicity. 
’ This data set was prepared by Steven J. Dubnoff for his dissertation, 
“The Family and Absence from Work: Irish Workers in a Lowell, Mass. 
Cotton Mill, 1860,” Brandeis University, April 1976. The data ftle contains 
the names and ethnicity of workers in Mill A of the Hamilton Mfg. Co. 
in June 1860. 
d The Register books of the Hamilton Mfg. Col, Volumes 482, 483, 
485, 486, 487, 488, 489, and 490, Manuscripts and Archives Division of 
Baker Library, were used to supply this list of names and ethnicities. 
Only the names of individuals who were leaving were used so that names 
drawn from the register books through March 19, 1849 (Vol. 490) would 
not overlap with the names in Dublin’s file, which includes individuals 
present in the Hamilton Co. in August 1850. 
The first stage of assigning the probability of Irish or non-Irish ethnicity 
to particular names involved ascertaining the frequency that a given 
unique last name was Irish or non-Irish from the “population”. of last 
names comprised of the 49,781 surnames of known ethnicity. Since two 
names could have been the same name phonetically but have been spelled 
differently by an agent or an illiterate worker, a more liberal phonetic 
assignment was used on 1730, or 3.5% of the total names (all of which 
were in the Dublin and Dubnoff samples). Once the frequencies of Irish 
or non-Irish last names were established, frequencies of women workers’ 
first names were calculated using the Dublin and Dubnoff samples (using 
the same phonetic rules as for last names). The next step involved pulling 
out all individuals who, on the basis of surnames, had a 100% probability 
of being either Irish or non-Irish. The average ethnicity per month of 
these individuals established a trend rate of ethnicity over the period. 
The probable ethnicity of individuals who do not have a 100% probability 
of being Irish or non-Irish depends upon when the individual first arrived 
in the mill. For example, one might say that a “Catherine Hagar” had 
a greater probability of being Irish if she arrived in 1855 than if she 
arrived in 1834. The final step was to use the first and last name probabilities 
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calculated from the four samples to assign an ethnicity probability to 
each individual in the Lawrence Mill No. 2 sample. The following rules 
were used: (1) If an individual’s surname frequency was 75-100% Irish 
or non-Irish, then the individual was assigned that probability of being 
Irish or non-Irish, respectively. (2) If the surname frequency of an individual 
was between 25 and 75% Irish or non-Irish then the frequency of that 
individual’s first name was also used in the calculation of an equal footing 
with the surname. (3) If no probability was available for a given surname, 
then probable ethnicity was assigned by the frequency of first name 
ethnicity. (4) If no surname or first name frequency was available for an 
individual, then that individual was assigned the value of the trend in 
ethnicity for the first month that the individual arrived in Mill No. 2. 
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